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Dynamic Pricing of Power in Smart-Grid Networks
Qingsi Wang, Mingyan Liu and Rahul Jain
Abstract
In this paper we introduce the problem of dynamic pricing of power for smart-grid networks. This is studied
within a network utility maximization (NUM) framework in a deterministic setting with a single provider, multiple
users and a finite horizon. The provider produces power or buys power in a (deterministic) spot market, and
determines a dynamic price to charge the users. The users then adjust their demand in response to the time-
varying prices. This is typically categorized as the demand response problem, and we study a progression of
related models by focusing on two aspects: 1) the characterization of the structure of the optimal dynamic prices
in the Smart Grid and the optimal demand and supply under various interaction with a spot market; 2) a greedy
approach to facilitate the solution process of the aggregate NUM problem and the optimality gap between the
greedy solution and the optimal one.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Smart Grid takes shape, new possibilities of efficient management of the electric power grid open
up. One of these is pricing of electricity to consumers. Currently, temporal variations in the cost of electricity
are hidden behind inflexible rate designs. This leads to inefficiencies with over-consumption during peak times,
and under-consumption during off-peak times. It also makes the problem of matching demand and supply, both
of which are uncertain, and affect grid stability, particularly acute. In the United States, only 60-100 hours of
the year can account for 10-18 percent of the system peak load [1]. Meeting this critical peak load requires
installation, operation and maintenance of expensive combustion gas-turbine generators, since these start almost
instantaneously.
Dynamic pricing of electricity to consumers can remedy this problem by inducing consumers to switch off or
defer some of the non-urgent, non-critical loads. For example, dish-washers in most households have a delayed
start option. And yet, only a small fraction of consumers utilize this feature and use the appliance later at
night at off-peak times. Dynamic pricing can make consumers sensitive to their time and amount of electricity
consumption, thus potentially smoothing out peak-time system loads, and enhancing economic efficiency.
Dynamic pricing rate designs are receiving increased attention by state commissions, with the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) having set a deadline of 2011 for the state electric utilities to propose dynamic
pricing rate structures. These are defined as an electric rate structure that reflects the actual wholesale market
conditions. Dynamic pricing can take various forms such as critical peak-pricing, time-of-use pricing and real-time
pricing. CPUC defines the real-time price as the rate linked to the actual price in the wholesale hourly electricity
market [2]. Such prices can be communicated to the consumers over the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI),
or a smart-grid network [3] and displayed on a smart meter.
Literature Overview. Problems related to the design and operation of a Smart Grid are receiving increasing
attention. The problem of dynamic pricing to shape demand is typically called demand response. There exists
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2a large literature on demand response; the most relevant is [4]. This paper formulates the problem of optimal
demand response in discrete time over a finite time horizon when users have some storage available, and the
formulation can be categorized as a network utility maximization (NUM) problem (see [5], [6] and the references
therein). Using Lagrangian duality, it establishes the existence of a solution, and gives a distributed algorithm
based on gradient projection to compute this solution. The modeling of various appliances into the proposed
optimization framework is also studied. In [7], a different approach is taken wherein demand is required to match
supply, and users bid for load-shedding in an iterative supply function bidding mechanism, that was first proposed
in [8]. Both competitive and Nash equilibrium analysis is provided but the focus is on a single instant, and without
storage. In [9], the focus is on optimal power flow through the network, wherein existence of a zero duality gap
solution is proved. In contrast to aforementioned work, particularly [4], in this paper we study a progression of
related models by focusing on two aspects: 1) the characterization of the structure of the optimal dynamic prices
in the Smart Grid and the optimal demand and supply under various interaction with a spot market; 2) a greedy
approach to facilitate the solution process of the aggregate NUM and the optimality gap between the greedy
solution and the optimal one.
Other works have focused on electricity markets. While [10] provides a stability analysis of the wholesale
electricity market, [11] has focused on means for wind power generators to participate in the day-ahead electricity
market. The difficulty in this is that wind-power generators cannot enter into binding contracts for a day-ahead
power supply without assuming a huge risk. Thus, alternative market architectures are considered in [12], wherein
entities called “aggregators” buy power from the wind power generators and participate in the day-ahead markets.
The paper proposes optimal mechanisms that the aggregators can use to get the wind power generators to reveal
their true distributions, and thus minimize the risk due to uncertainty in supply from the contracted wind power
generators. A related paper is [13], wherein mechanisms for riskless dispatch by the generators are given for use
with the current market architecture.
Results and organization of this paper. The system model is first presented in Section II, and three related problems
are introduced. The first problem SYSTEM is a simplified special case of the main model with internalized
production cost, which provides a preliminary framework for more realistic refinement. Its optimal solution is
characterized in Section III based on a dual decomposition; moreover, a distributed algorithm to solve SYSTEM,
which can be readily adapted for problems in the same family, is also proposed. In Section IV we extend the
SYSTEM problem to the scenario where the provider may purchase in part from a spot market with an exogenous
cost to narrow the demand-supply gap. This is referred to as the SYS_SPOT problem, and the interaction between
the decision of purchase and the spot market price is investigated. We then consider the explicit effect of the
production cost in a third problem in Section V, and the structure of its optimal control in the single-user scenario
is studied. A greedy algorithm to approximate the solution to SYSTEM is presented in Section VI, where an upper
bound on the optimality gap is established and heuristics on evaluating this gap are discussed. Numerical results
of sample problems are illustrated in Section VII. We present an attempt of adopting distributed Newton’s method
to problems in this work in Section VIII, and Section IX concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
Consider a smart-grid network that consists of n users or households, and one provider. We consider a discrete-
time model with a finite horizon tf . A user i consumes xi(t) power at time step t, and the supply by the grid
is denoted as zi(t). The excess supply/demand is charged to/discharged from the user’s battery with capacity
Bi. The energy level/state of the battery before operation at time t is denoted by yi(t). We assume that the
3total supply from the grid at time t is upper bounded by Ct, and the total demand of user i over time is upper
bounded by Di. For convenience we define the following vector forms of the above quantities: the demand
of user i, xi =
[
xi(0), xi(1), · · · , xi(tf )
]T
; the supply of the grid zi =
[
zi(0), zi(1), · · · , zi(tf )
]T
;
the state of user i’s battery, yi =
[
yi(1), yi(2), · · · , yi(tf + 1)
]T
; the battery capacities of users B =[
B1, B2, · · · , Bn
]T
; the supply constraint of the grid C =
[
C0, C1, · · · , Ctf
]T
; the demand constraint
of users D =
[
D1, D2, · · · , Dn
]T
. Also, x = vect(x1, . . . , xn) with vect(u1, . . . , un) being the stacked
vector from u1 to un, and similarly define y and z. When user i draws power xi over time, her satisfaction is
measured by the utility function
Ui(xi) =
tf∑
t=0
Vi(xi(t)),
where Vi : R+ → R+ is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable function of xi(t). Denote
by y˙i(t) the change of battery state of user i at time t:
y˙i(t) = yi(t+ 1)− yi(t) = zi(t)− xi(t).
Assuming zero initial state, y(0) = 0, we then have
yi(t) = yi(0) +
t−1∑
s=0
y˙i(s) =
t−1∑
s=0
(zi(s)− xi(s)).
Therefore,
yi = H(zi − xi),
where
H =

1 0 · · · 0 0
1 1
.
.
. 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 1 · · · 1 0
1 1 · · · 1 1

∈ R(tf+1)×(tf+1).
In addition, since the battery suffers wear and tear due to usage, we model maintenance and operational costs as
M(yi) =
tf+1∑
t=1
m(yi(t)),
where m : R+ → R+ is a strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice differentiable function of yi(t). The
objective is to maximize the sum of individual utilities of both users and the provider or the social welfare.
Formally, we consider the following related problems in this paper. The main model is given as follows.
maximize
n∑
i=1
(
Ui(xi)−M(yi)
)
− P (z) (1)
subject to yi  Bi1 (2)
yi = H(zi − xi) (3)
4n∑
i=1
zi  C (4)
1Txi ≤ Di (5)
xi, yi, zi  0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (6)
where P : Rn(tf+1)+ → R+ is the production cost function to be specified later, and 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T with
proper sizes. We begin with a simplified special case of this problem by assuming P = 0; this is denoted as
SYSTEM (U,M,B,H,C,D). The motivation for studying this degenerated model is twofold: 1) it models the
scenario when the production cost is realized thus fixed before the distribution of energy or when the marginal
cost is zero such as in the case of renewable energies; 2) more critically, it provides a preliminary framework that
reveals the basic structure of optimal solutions and their algorithmic implementation that can be readily extended
to more realistic models.
We then consider the setting wherein the grid may purchase power from an external spot market to narrow the
demand-supply gap, while incurring an exogenous cost; this is formulated as the SYS_SPOT (U,M,B,H,C,D;σ)
problem as follows.
maximize
n∑
i=1
(
Ui(xi)−M(yi)
)
− σT
[
n∑
i=1
zi − C
]+
(7)
subject to yi  Bi1 (8)
yi = H(zi − xi) (9)
1Txi ≤ Di (10)
xi, yi, zi  0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (11)
where σ =
[
σ0, σ1, . . . σtf
]
is the price vector of unit power in the spot market, and [·]+ = max{·, 0}. Our
main interest in this problem is the characterization of spot market prices that may incentivize the exogenous
purchase. In particular, we show that there is a threshold price below which this purchase is justified, and it is
closely related to the optimal solution to SYSTEM.
Our last model considers non-trivial production costs. We consider the linear cost in the original setting with
multiple users, that is, P (z) = σTdz , where dz =
∑n
i=1 zi is the vector of aggregate demands, and σ can be either
interpreted as the unit power generation cost or the spot market price when the provider produces nothing of its
own and completely resorts to the spot market for supply. This model is denoted by SYS2 (U,M,B,H,C,D).
We also consider a general convex cost in the single-user case that has an explicit control structure.
In the next section we start with the SYSTEM problem, and note that when constraint (4) is decoupled, the
SYSTEM problem can be separated into several subproblems. This observation motivates us to consider the
dual-decomposition based technique to solve the SYSTEM problem [5], [6], which we show next.
III. DUAL DECOMPOSITION OF SYSTEM AND THE PROPERTIES OF ITS SOLUTIONS
In this section the SYSTEM problem is analyzed based on a dual decomposition, which also prompts a distributed
first-order algorithm to solve it, and the properties of both the primal and the dual optimal solutions (demand,
supply and prices) are discussed.
5A. Dual decomposition
We first reformulate SYSTEM (U,M,B,H,C,D) as
maximize
n∑
i=1
(
Ui(xi)−M(yi)
) (12)
subject to vect(x, y, z) ∈ F (13)
over vect(x, y, z) ∈ D (14)
where the domain and the feasible region are respectively given by
D =
{
vect(x, y, z)
∣∣∣∣∣ xi  0, 1
Txi ≤ Di,
0  yi  Bi1, zi  0,∀i
}
,
and
F =
{
vect(x, y, z)
∣∣∣ yi = H(zi − xi),∑ zi  C,∀i} .
Note that relintD ∩ F 6= ∅ when B, C and D are all positive, as we shall assume so. Indeed, let ǫ > 0 be
chosen later, and consider
xˆi(t) = α
Di − ǫ
tf + 1
,
where 0 < α ≤ 1 satisfying
α
∑n
i=1Di
tf + 1
< min
t
Ct,
zˆi(t) = xˆi(t) +
αǫ
tf+1
and yˆi(t) =
∑t−1
s=0(zˆi(s) − xˆi(s)). Let ǫ < mini{min{Bi,Di}}, and it can be verified that
vect(xˆ, yˆ, zˆ) ∈ relintD ∩ F . In addition, since this problem is convex and the inequality constraint is affine,
Slater’s condition is then satisfied, and hence, strong duality will hold. Because of the strict concavity of the
objective function in x and y, there are unique optima for x, y and z. As pointed out before, the structure of the
SYSTEM problem prompts a solution based on a dual decomposition. Its Lagrangian is given by
L =
n∑
i=1
(
Ui(xi)−M(yi)
)
+
n∑
i=1
νTi
(
H(zi − xi)− yi
)
+ θT
(
C −
n∑
i=1
zi
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
Ui(xi)− ν
T
i Hxi
)
−
n∑
i=1
(
M(yi) + ν
T
i yi
)
−
n∑
i=1
(θ −HT νi)
T zi + θ
TC.
Let ν = vect(ν1, . . . , νn). The dual function is then given by
g(ν, θ) = max
vect(x,y,z)∈D
L(x, y, z, ν, θ)
=
n∑
i=1
max
xi0,
1Txi≤Di
Wi(xi; νi)−
n∑
i=1
min
0yiBi1
Ri(yi; νi)−
n∑
i=1
min
zi0
(θ −HT νi)
T zi + θ
TC,
where
Wi(xi; νi) = Ui(xi)− ν
T
i Hxi,
and
Ri(yi; νi) = M(yi) + ν
T
i yi,
6and we introduce
USERi : maximize Wi(xi; νi)
subject to xi  0, 1Txi ≤ Di
(15)
and
USER
′
i
: minimize Ri(yi; νi)
subject to 0  yi  Bi1
(16)
as two subproblems for user i. Since the minimization with respect to zi is a linear problem, which is readily
solved, the dual problem is given by DUAL_SYS (U,M,B,H,C,D):
minimize
n∑
i=1
(
W ⋆i (νi)−R
⋆
i (νi)
)
+ θTC
subject to θ −HT νi  0, θ  0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
where W ⋆i (νi) and R⋆i (νi) are the optimal values of problem (15) and (16) for a given νi. Given now this dual
decomposition structure, a distributive algorithm can be readily proposed to solve SYSTEM, and this is widely
studied in the literature, see e.g. [5], [4]. We report our version of the algorithm in Appendix A and show its
convergence.
B. Properties of solutions to SYSTEM and DUAL_SYS
Denote by x⋆ = vect(x⋆1, . . . , x⋆n) the optimum for x in SYSTEM; ν⋆ is an optimal solution for ν of DUAL_SYS,
and similarly define y⋆, z⋆ and θ⋆, respectively. We first note that HT νi can be interpreted as the price vector
that the provider charges from user i for each unit of consumed energy, in light of subproblem USERi, given that
it is component-wise non-negative. Indeed, the following result establishes this premise.
Proposition 1: HT ν⋆i  0 for all i.
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Remark 1: Since zi(t) is the total amount of energy distributed to user i at time t, under the interpretation of
HT νi being a price vector it is as if the energy buffered in battery were only charged when it is later consumed
while incurring a storage cost before the consumption. This obviously is not what actually happens in practice,
but serves as an interesting interpretation of the result. We do note that if there is no battery buffering in the
model, this interpretation is consistent with the notion of shadow price in the literature (see e.g. [14], [15]), i.e.,
entries of HT νi are shadow prices of power.
Hence, θ⋆(t) = maxi
(
HT ν⋆i
)
t
for all t. Moreover, 1) if we assume that x⋆i ∈ intXi for all i, where Xi is
the feasible set of (15), i.e., Xi =
{
xi | xi  0, 1Txi ≤ Di
}
, HT ν⋆i is then uniquely determined for each i;
2) alternatively, if we assume that x⋆i ∈ intXi for at least one i, say ik, and z⋆ik ≻ 0, HTν⋆ik is then uniquely
determined and from the minimization with respect to zik we get that θ⋆ = HT ν⋆ik . In either case, θ
⋆ is also
uniquely determined.
In Section IV, we will consider the situation where there is a gap between the users demand and the power
generation capacity of the grid at some time instants. At those instants, the grid may purchase power from the
spot market to narrow the demand-supply gap. We will show therein that the above unique θ⋆ is a “lower bound”
on the price of unit power in the spot market above which the grid decides to make no purchase.
7Also, we can determine the closed form of y⋆ given ν⋆ based on (16). Since the objective and the constraint
are both separable in time, we conclude
y⋆i (t) = [m
′−1(−ν⋆i (t− 1))]
Bi
0
for all i and t > 0, where [·]ba is the projection operator onto [a, b], i.e., [x]ba := min{max{x, a}, b}. Let
ρ⋆i := H
T ν⋆i , and ρ˙⋆i (t) := ρ⋆i (t)− ρ⋆i (t− 1) = −ν⋆i (t− 1). We then obtain
y⋆i (t) = [m
′−1(ρ˙⋆i (t))]
Bi
0 .
If we assume that 0 < y⋆i (t) < Bi, the above result can be rewritten as
ρ˙⋆i (t) = m
′(y⋆i (t)).
Therefore, at optimality the marginal cost of reallocating the power purchase from t − 1 to t is equal to the
marginal cost of storing the energy in battery after purchasing in t − 1, which is intuitively appealing. When
the demand is known and fixed a priori, some structural results on the optimal power generation and battery
scheduling in a single user setting can be found in [16]. In Section V, we will also discuss in detail the explicit
structure of optimal control in the single-user problem when a non-zero production cost is incorporated in our
main model.
IV. SPOT MARKET
In this section, we consider the SYS_SPOT problem. As before, we reformulate this problem and its domain
and the feasible region are the same as in the SYSTEM problem. Also, there are unique optima for x, y and z
because of the strict concavity of the objective function in x and y.
Denote by z⋆(σ) = (z⋆1(σ), . . . , z⋆n(σ)) the optimal solution for z of SYS_SPOT given σ. Define
S =
{
σ
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
z⋆i (σ)  C
}
.
In the following, we characterize S using the solutions of the SYSTEM problem and its dual problem DUAL_SYS.
To avoid ambiguity, symbols without hat are variables in SYS_SPOT, and others are for the SYSTEM problem
and its dual. We assume that either of the two cases below is true:
Assumption 1:
a) x⋆i ∈ intXi for all i, or
b) x⋆i ∈ intXi for at least one i, say ik, and z⋆ik ≻ 0.
Recall that x⋆i denotes the optimal solution to the SYS_SPOT problem for xi, and Xi is the feasible set of (15).
In the following proposition, we show that S can be characterized with a threshold of prices.
Proposition 2: σ ∈ S if and only if σ  θ̂⋆, noting that θ̂⋆ is the optimal dual variable in DUAL_SYS
(U,M,B,H,C,D).
Proof: 1) Necessity. First of all, the Lagrangian of SYS_SPOT is given by L(x, y, z, ν, µ),
L =
n∑
i=1
(Ui(xi)−M(yi))− σ
T
[
n∑
i=1
zi − C
]+
+
n∑
i=1
νTi
(
H(zi − xi)− yi
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
Ui(xi)− ν
T
i Hxi
)
−
n∑
i=1
(
M(yi) + ν
T
i yi
)
− σT
[
n∑
i=1
zi − C
]+
+
n∑
i=1
νTi Hzi.
8Group the terms in a similar way as in DUAL_SYS, and the dual problem is
minimize
n∑
i=1
(
W ⋆i (νi)−R
⋆
i (νi)
)
−G⋆(ν;σ)
subject to µi + νi  0
µi  0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
where W ⋆i and R⋆i are the respective optimal values of problems (15) and (16) for a given νi as in DUAL_SYS,
and G⋆(ν;σ) is the optimal value of
minimize σT
[
n∑
i=1
zi − C
]+
−
n∑
i=1
νTi Hzi
subject to zi  0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
(17)
Because of strong duality1, the optimal solution (x⋆, y⋆, z⋆) to SYS_SPOT is also the maximizer of the
Lagrangian L(x, y, z, ν⋆) where ν⋆ is an optimal solution of the dual. Therefore, z⋆ is an optimal solution of
(17) when ν = ν⋆. Since ∑ni=1 z⋆i is finite, we must have σ  HT ν⋆i for all i. On the other hand, provided∑n
i=1 z
⋆
i  C , we can obtain the same solution (x⋆, y⋆, z⋆) of SYS_SPOT by solving the SYSTEM problem with
the same parameter set (U,M,B,H,C,D). Recalling the properties of solutions to SYSTEM in Section III-B,
under assumption a) we have ν⋆i and ν̂⋆i are uniquely determined and ν⋆i = ν̂⋆i for all i. In addition, θ̂⋆(t) =
maxi
(
HT ν̂⋆i
)
t
for all t. Under assumption b) we have ν⋆ik = ν̂⋆ik and θ̂⋆ = HT ν̂⋆ik . In either case, it follows that
σ  θ̂⋆.
2) Sufficiency. We only provide an outline of the proof here. Our strategy is to show that the optimal solution
(x̂⋆, ŷ⋆, ẑ⋆) to the SYSTEM problem with optimal dual variables (ν̂⋆, θ̂⋆) also satisfies the KKT conditions of
SYS_SPOT when σ  θ̂⋆, and then because of strong duality and convexity of SYS_SPOT, it is also the optimal
solution of SYS_SPOT with optimal dual variables ν⋆ = ν̂⋆, given the spot market price σ. To this end, note that
the KKT conditions of SYS_SPOT only differ from those of SYSTEM in the dual feasibility and the stationarity
conditions because of the replacement of θ̂ with σ and the non-differentiable term in the objective function. Recall
that θ̂⋆(t) = maxi
(
HT ν̂⋆i
)
t
for all t, and we have σ  HT ν̂⋆i if σ  θ̂⋆. Let ∂ziL denote the subdifferential
of the Lagrangian of SYS_SPOT with respect to zi for all i. Hence, when σ  θ̂⋆ and νi = ν̂⋆i , 0 ∈ ∂ziL for
all zi = ẑ⋆i , and hence combining other optimality conditions, we obtain (x̂⋆, ŷ⋆, ẑ⋆, ν̂⋆) is a primal-dual optimal
solution given σ  θ̂⋆.
V. SYS2 AND THE STRUCTURE OF OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR A SINGLE USER
Under some circumstances, we have an explicit form of the solution to the SYS2 problem, which is given by
the following proposition.
Proposition 3: At time t,
∑n
i=1 z
⋆
i (t) = Ct if (HT ν⋆i )t > σt for some i, and z⋆i (t) = 0 if (HT ν⋆i )t < σt.
Proof: The results follow from the KKT conditions. Firstly, the dual feasibility and the complementary
slackness specify that
θ  0, θT
(
C −
n∑
i=1
zi
)
= 0.
1It can be shown that the reformulated SYS_SPOT problem is convex and Slater’s condition is satisfied.
9Furthermore, consider the Lagrangian of SYS2 and by the stationarity condition we have
σ + θ −HT νi  0, (σ + θ −H
T νi)
T zi = 0.
for all i. Thus, if (HT νi)t > σt for some i at time t, then θ(t) > 0. Therefore,
∑n
i=1 zi(t) = Ct. On the other
hand, if (HT νi)t < σt, we have σt + θ(t)− (HT νi)t > 0, and hence zi(t) = 0.
In the rest of this section, we focus on the decision-making by a single user and a single provider, and derive
the structure of optimal policy. We relax our previous constraints such that they are now separable in time, and
we assume that y(t + 1) ∈ [0, B], x(t) ∈ [0,D] and z(t) ∈ [0, C] for all t = 0, · · · , tf , where the user index
i is now omitted. We assume that if a quantity z(t) is produced at time t, the cost is Pt(z(t)) where Pt is
strictly increasing and convex in z(t). Most of our notation is consistent with previous sections except that M
will signify the scalar maintenance cost. Then, the decision-making problem is given by the following optimal
control problem, OPT_CONTROL:
max
∑tf
t=0[V (x(t))− Pt(z(t)) −M(y(t+ 1))] (18)
s.t. y˙(t) = z(t)− x(t),∀t }ρ(t)
µ0(t){ 0 ≤ y(t) ≤ B, ∀t, }µ1(t)
λ0(t){ 0 ≤ x(t) ≤ D, ∀t, }λ1(t)
θ0(t){ 0 ≤ z(t) ≤ C, ∀t, }θ1(t)
y(0) = y0,
where y˙(t) = y(t+1)−y(t). Denote the dual variables to the above constraints by ρ(t), µ0(t), µ1(t), λ0(t), λ1(t), θ0(t)
and θ1(t), as shown above. Then, due to strong duality, the KKT conditions suggest that there exist y⋆, x⋆, z⋆,
ρ⋆, µ⋆0, µ
⋆
1, λ
⋆
0, λ
⋆
1, θ
⋆
0, θ
⋆
1 that satisfy
V ′(x⋆(t))− ρ⋆(t)− λ⋆1(t) + λ
⋆
0(t) = 0, (19)
−P ′t(z
⋆(t)) + ρ⋆(t)− θ⋆1(t) + θ
⋆
0(t) = 0, (20)
−M ′(y⋆(t)) + ρ˙⋆(t)− µ⋆1(t) + µ
⋆
0(t) = 0, (21)
µ⋆0(t)y
⋆(t) = 0, µ⋆1(t)[B − y
⋆(t)] = 0, (22)
λ⋆0(t)x
⋆(t) = 0, λ⋆1(t)[D − x
⋆(t)] = 0, (23)
θ⋆0(t)z
⋆(t) = 0, θ⋆1(t)[C − z
⋆(t)] = 0, (24)
such that (x⋆, z⋆) is the optimal control law and y⋆ is the state of the system, where ρ˙(t) = ρ(t)− ρ(t− 1) for
t ≥ 1.
Now, from KKT conditions (21), we have
ρ⋆(t) =
t∑
s=1
M ′(y⋆(s)) +
t∑
s=1
[µ⋆1(s)− µ
⋆
0(s)] + ρ
⋆(0). (25)
Further, from KKT conditions (20), we have
Pt(z
⋆(t)) = ρ⋆(t)− [θ⋆1(t)− θ
⋆
0(t)]
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for all t. From this, using the complementary slackness conditions (24), we can conclude that either Pt(0) =
ρ⋆(t) + θ⋆0(t), or Pt(C) = ρ
⋆(t)− θ⋆1(t), or Pt(z
⋆(t)) = ρ⋆(t). We can summarize this as
z⋆(t) =
[
P−1t (ρ
⋆(t))
]C
0
. (26)
Similarly, from KKT conditions (19), we get
V ′(x⋆(t)) = ρ⋆(t) + (λ⋆1(t)− λ
⋆
0(t)),
which together with the complementary slackness conditions (23), implies that
x⋆(t) =
[
V ′−1(ρ⋆(t))
]D
0
. (27)
From (26) and (27), we conclude that z⋆(t) is non-decreasing and x⋆(t) is non-increasing in ρ⋆(t) for each
t. Moreover, x⋆(t + 1) ≤ x⋆(t) whenever ρ⋆(t + 1) ≥ ρ⋆(t). In the following, we assume that Pt = P , and
consequently z⋆(t + 1) ≥ z⋆(t) whenever ρ⋆(t + 1) ≥ ρ⋆(t). Using (25) and the complementary slackness
conditions (22), we also conclude that if y(t) > 0 for all t ∈ T = {τ1, τ1 + 1, . . . , τ2}, ρ(t) is then strictly
increasing in t over T .
Combing the results obtained above, we conclude the following only possible dynamics of the optimal control,
and the detailed analysis can be found in Appendix D.
(i) x⋆(0) > z⋆(0) when y0 > 0, and x⋆ is non-increasing, y⋆ decreasing, z⋆ non-decreasing in t. Either
tx=z = ty=0 ≤ tf (i.e., x⋆(t) = z⋆(t) and y⋆(t) = 0 simultaneously) and from then on the control and the
state maintain fixed until t = tf , or x⋆(t) > z⋆(t) and y⋆(t) > 0 until the time horizon.
(ii) x⋆(0) = z⋆(0) when y0 = 0, and the control and the state maintain fixed until t = tf .
In addition, once x⋆(t) = z⋆(t) = u, we have u = [min{C,D, u˜}]+ where u˜ is such that V ′(u˜) = P ′(u˜).
To conclude, we sketch the dynamics of the optimal control and the state of case (i) in Figure 1. Note that the
change of x⋆, y⋆ and z⋆ are not necessarily linear.
x, z
y
0
0
t
t
z
y0
tf
tx=z
ty=0
u
x
u = [min{C,D, u˜}]+
u˜ : V ′(u˜) = P ′(u˜)
Fig. 1. The optimal policy for a single user
VI. A GREEDY APPROACH
In this section, we consider a greedy approach to approximating the solution to the SYSTEM problem. The
need for a greedy approach can be motivated by the following considerations:
1) depending on the definition of time scale of a step, the convergence time may exceed the time step;
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2) some parameters such as B, C and D may be stochastic within the time horizon, and we can only observe
their realizations a posteriori.
Thus, we consider the following sequence of single-step optimization problems as approximations to the SYSTEM
problem. We denote each by SYS_GREEDY (V,B,Ct,D; t),
maximize
n∑
i=1
Vi(xi(t)) (28)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi(t) ≤ Ct (29)
xi(t) +
t−1∑
s=0
x⋆i (s) ≤ Di (30)
xi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (31)
where (x⋆i (s), i = 1, . . . , n) is the optimal solution to SYS_GREEDY (V,B,Cs,D; s). Note that because of the
myopic nature of each single-step optimization, it does not consider utilizing battery to store energy for future
use, and thus the dimension of the greedy formulation reduces to that of the space of x.
There are a number of interesting problems to investigate. One of them is whether there is a speed advantage of
SYS_GREEDY over SYSTEM, and the other is the optimality gap between them. We will present numerical results
on the convergence rate of SYS_GREEDY in Section VII, and in the rest of this section we will characterize the
solution of SYS_GREEDY and subsequently the optimality gap.
In the following presentation including Section VII, we limit our discussion to the case where the utility
functions of users at a given time step are identical, i.e., Vi = V . We denote by x⋆i and x
g,⋆
i the optimal solutions
of SYSTEM and SYS_GREEDY, respectively. Define χ⋆,gi = 1
Txg,⋆i and χ⋆i = 1
Tx⋆i , and denote by χi, N0 and
N1 the output of the following procedure.
Procedure GetChi(B, C, D)
Initialize N0 ← {1, 2, . . . , n}, N1 ← ∅, prev N0 ← N0
repeat
prev N0 ← N0
for i ∈ N0 do
if (1TC −
∑
j∈N1
Dj)/|N0| < Di then
χi ← (1TC −
∑
j∈N1
Dj)/|N0|
else
χi ← Di
N0 ← N0 − {i}, N1 ← N1 ∪ {i}
end if
end for
until N0 = prev N0 or N0 ← ∅
return χi, i = 1, . . . , n,N0,N1
The above procedure can be literally described as a best-effort balanced water-filling process. That is, it attempts
to fill each water tank (user) the same amount of water (energy), subject to their capacity (demand) constraints,
and whenever smaller ones of them overflow, the excess goes to larger tanks in equal amounts. The following
proposition asserts that this procedure in fact results in the optimal total per-user amount of energy.
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Proposition 4: χ⋆,gi = χ⋆i = χi for all i.
Proof: That χ⋆,gi = χi for all i is straightforward, and we prove that χ⋆i = χi for all i in Appendix C.
Remark 2: The balanced property of optimal solutions is a consequence of the concavity and the user-
independence of utility function that we assumed. For user-dependent utility functions, we conjecture that the
solution may be in a scaled form of balanced power distribution.
Let p⋆ and pg,⋆ be the optimal value of SYSTEM and the sum of optimal values of SYS_GREEDY, respectively.
Note that xi(t) = χ⋆i
(
Ct
1TC
)
, i = 1, . . . , n, t = 0, . . . tf , are feasible solutions to the sequence of greedy
optimization. The optimality gap is then upper bounded by
p⋆ − pg,⋆ ≤(tf + 1)
n∑
i=1
V (
χ⋆i
tf + 1
)−
tf∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
V (χ⋆i
Ct
1TC
). (32)
Eqn. (32) suggests that the optimality gap would shrink as the power generation capacity C is more balanced
among time steps. Moreover, observe that the loss of optimality of the greedy approach results from the myopic
optimization that overlooks the use of energy buffer (i.e., battery) to balance energy dispatch between steps. We
thus conjecture that the vector C in a roughly ascending order could yield a smaller optimality gap.
VII. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we illustrate the demand sensitivity to spot market price that we studied in Section IV, using
two sample problems that are specified in Table I. We also empirically show the advantage in the convergence
rate of the proposed greedy approach compared to the SYSTEM problem, when the respective optimization is
performed using the same distributed algorithm based on gradient projection.
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(b) σ(2) = κ · θ̂⋆(2)
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(c) σ = κ · θ̂⋆
Fig. 2. Demand sensitivity to spot market price for the sample problem n = 10, tf = 4.
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(b) σ(3) = κ · θ̂⋆(3)
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(c) σ = κ · θ̂⋆
Fig. 3. Demand sensitivity to spot market price for the sample problem n = 20, tf = 6.
As shown in Proposition 2, θ̂⋆ assumes the threshold value of spot market price σ, and in Figure 2 and 3
we tune σ in three different ways to demonstrate the behaviors of optimal demand. The tests are performed
for both sample problems and we elaborate the one with n = 10, tf = 4 for example. In the first scenario, we
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set σ(t) = θ̂⋆(t) for t > 0 and σ(0) = κ · θ̂⋆(0), where κ is a tunable parameter. We scale the third entry of
σ in the second scenario and the entire price vector in the third one. In Figure 2 and 3, we plot the curves of
‖[
∑n
i=1 zi−C]
+‖1 versus κ, respectively. As can be seen in the figures, the demand increases as κ decreases when
κ < 1 until hitting the demand constraint, and remains unchanged when κ ≥ 1, as suggested by Proposition 2.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE TWO SAMPLE PROBLEMS IN SECTION VII.
B C D
n = 10, tf = 4 [10, . . . , 10]
T [8, 7, . . . , 4]T [1, 2, . . . , 10]T
n = 20, tf = 6 [10, . . . , 10]
T [10, 9, . . . , 4]T [0.5, 1, . . . , 10]T
V (a) = log(1 + a) and m(b) = 12b
2
TABLE II
TOTAL RUNTIME (ITERATIONS) OF SAMPLE PROBLEMS.
SYSTEM SYS_GREEDY
n = 10, tf = 4 25.0959s(100) 0.0206s(210)
n = 20, tf = 6 68.0778s(158) 0.0316s(197)
In Table II, we report the respective convergence rates of SYSTEM and SYS_GREEDY. Though these records
are machine-dependent, it demonstrates the significant comparative advantage of the latter in speed, and the
greedy approach can be used as a good approximation to SYSTEM when the optimality gap bounded by (32) is
acceptable.
VIII. A DISTRIBUTED PRIMAL-DUAL ALGORITHM: NEWTON’S METHOD
In this section, we present a distributed second-order algorithm, namely Newton’s method, to solve the SYSTEM
problem. We first reformulate SYSTEM and approximate it with an equality-constrained problem, and apply
Newton’s method on the primal problem. Theory and application of distributed Newton’s method in network
optimization can be found in [17], [18], [19] and etc. Instead of solving the dual problem where updating
Lagrange dual variables can be interpreted as dynamic pricing, this algorithm works on the primal side and
the solving process can be regarded as dynamic resource slicing [5]. In this section, we assume that −Ui is
self-concordant [20] for all i for the proof of convergence. A convex function f : R → R is self-concordant if
|f ′′′(x)| ≤ 2f ′′(x)3/2 for all x ∈ dom f , and self-concordant functions include linear, convex quadratic functions,
negative logarithm and etc.
We first introduce non-negative slack variables to three inequality constraints, that is,
1Txi + pi = Di, yi + qi = Bi1,
n∑
i=1
zi + r = C,
and using the logarithmic barrier function for non-negative constraints, we approximate our original problem with
an equality constrained problem as follows. Let p = vect(p1, . . . , pn) and q = vect(q1, . . . , qn). To simplify our
notation, we also define w = vect(x, y, z, p, q, r), that is, for instance, wi = xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and wi(t) = xi(t)
and etc. We also define the logarithm for vector u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Rm to be
log u =
∑
t
log ut.
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Let
f(w) = −
n∑
i=1
Ui(wi) +
2n∑
i=n+1
M(wi)− τ
5n+1∑
i=1
logwi,
and f is also self-concordant for τ ≥ 1. Define
A =

Ξ 0 0 In 0 0
0 In(tf+1) 0 0 In(tf+1) 0
Γ In(tf+1) −Γ 0 0 0
0 0 S 0 0 Itf+1

where I(m) is the m×m identity matrix,
Ξ =

1T
.
.
.
1T
 ,Γ =

H
.
.
.
H
 ,
and S = [Itf+1, . . . , Itf+1], and also define b = vect (D,B11, . . . , Bn1, 0, C). The original problem can be then
approximated as
minimize f(w)
subject to Aw = b
It can be shown that as τ approaches zero, the optimum of the above approximating problem converges to that
of the original one.
Like the gradient projection method, the Newton’s method solves the above problem through an iterated update
procedure. In each iteration, we have
wk+1 = wk + γmαk∆wk,
where αk is the step-size, ∆wk is the Newton direction, γ is the discounting factor and
m = min{m′ ∈ Z+ | wk + γm
′
αk∆wk  0}.
Let Hk = ∇2f(wk) and gk = ∇f(xk). The Newton direction is then given by the solution to the following KKT
system, [
Hk A
T
A 0
][
∆wk
vk
]
= −
[
gk
0
]
where vk are dual variables associated with the equality constraint and 0 is null matrices with proper dimensions,
and it yields
∆wk = −H−1k (gk +A
T vk),
(AH−1k A
T )vk = −AH−1k gk.
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Note that f is separable for each wi(t), and hence gk only depends on local information with terms
∂f
∂wi(t)
=

−V ′i (xi(t))−
τ
xi(t)
, wi(t) = xi(t)
m′(yi(t))−
τ
yi(t)
, wi(t) = yi(t)
− τu(t) wi(t) = u(t),
u = zi, pi, qi, r
and Hk is a diagonal matrix with terms on the diagonal
∂2f
∂wi(t)2
=

−V ′′i(xi(t)) +
τ
xi(t)2
, wi(t) = xi(t)
m′′i(yi(t)) +
τ
yi(t)2
, wi(t) = yi(t)
τ
u(t)2 wi(t) = u(t),
u = zi, pi, qi, r
Therefore, ∆wk can be computed from collected data distributedly given the vector vk. Define the Newton
decrement λ(wk) as
λ(wk) = (∆wTkHk∆wk)
1/2,
and use the step-size [18]
αk =
 cλ(xk)+1 , if λ(xk) ≥ 141, o.w.
where c is some positive scalar that satisfies 5/6 < c < 1. The description of algorithm is then as follows.
Second-Order Algorithm for Power Distribution
User i’s algorithm At iterations k = 1, 2, . . .,
1) Receives from the grid ∆wk and λ(wk), and updates αk and wk+1.
2) Computes the associated terms in gk+1 and Hk+1, and communicates them to the grid.
Grid’s algorithm At iterations k = 1, 2, . . .,
1) Receives from each user gk and Hk.
2) Computes vk, ∆wk and λ(wk), and broadcast them to all users.
Note that our implementation is different from that in [17] and [18], where the computation of vk is centralized
at the grid, due to our introduction of partial computational capacity of the grid. The self-concordance based
convergence analysis is similar to [18] where τ is assumed greater than 1 to preserve the self-concordance of f ,
and the analysis is omitted for brevity2.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have studied key features of optimal dynamic prices in smart-grid networks. Moreover, an
attempt of adopting distributed Newton’s method to the model in this paper, namely the SYSTEM problem, is also
presented, which is however mainly designed to solve the primal problem and is categorized in the domain of
dynamic resource slicing instead of dynamic pricing. In this work, the explicit control structure for time-invariant
power production and energy buffering costs has been studied, and continuation of this effort under more general
2For the simplicity of presentation, we implicitly assume that the error in computing vk is negligible. In [18], the authors assume the
Hk-quadratic norm of error is upper bounded.
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cost functions is one direction of our future research. On the other hand, deviating from the deterministic setting
and investigating the optimal pricing with stochastic demand and supply is also one ongoing research project.
APPENDIX A
A DUAL-DECOMPOSITION BASED DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
Let
Q(ν, θ) =
n∑
i=1
(
W ⋆i (νi)−R
⋆
i (νi)
)
+ θTC,
and
E =
{
vect(µ, ν, θ)
∣∣∣ θ −HT νi  0, θ  0,∀i} .
Define x⋆i (νi) and y⋆i (νi)3 as the respective unique maximizers of (15) and (16). Let Qk = Q(νk, θk). We solve
DUAL_SYS using the gradient projection method, and the updating rule in the kth iteration is given by
ν˜k+1i = ν
k
i − α
k∇νiQ
k = νki + α
k
(
Hx⋆i (ν
k
i ) + y
⋆(νki )
)
θ˜k+1 = θk − αk∇θQ
k = θk − αkC
and
vect(νk+1, θk+1) =
[
vect(ν˜k+1, θ˜k+1)
]
E
,
where αk is a diminishing step-size satisfying
∞∑
k=1
αk =∞,
∞∑
k=1
(αk)2 <∞,
e.g., αk = 1+Γk+Γ with Γ a fixed non-negative number, and [x0]X is the projection of x0 onto a set X , or defined
as the following constrained quadratic program
minimize 1
2
‖x− x0‖
2
2
subject to x ∈ X
Because all gradients are bounded with diminishing step-size αk, the gradient projection method converges
for the dual problem [21], [22], [5]. Since x⋆i (νi) and y⋆i (νi) are the respective unique maximizers of (15) and
(16) and the strong duality holds, x⋆i (ν⋆i ) and y⋆i (ν⋆i ) are primal optimal, where ν⋆i are the solutions of the dual
problem. To summarize, we have the following:
First-Order Algorithm for Power Distribution
User i’s algorithm At iterations k = 1, 2, . . .,
1) Receives from the grid the dual variables νki
2) Computes x⋆i (νki ) and y⋆i (νki ), and communicates them to the grid
Grid’s algorithm At iterations k = 1, 2, . . .,
1) Receives from each user x⋆i (νki ) and y⋆i (νki ) for all i
2) Computes the dual variable νk+1i and θk+1 for all i, and communicates them accordingly to each user
3With a slight abuse of notation, we will use x(t) to denote the tth entry of x, and x(ν) as a function of ν.
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The algorithm would terminate when the following stopping criterion is satisfied:
‖vect(νk, θk)− vect(νk−1, θk−1)‖ ≤ ǫ,
where ǫ is a predefined constant.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We prove by contradiction. Assume that there exists at least one i such that (HT ν⋆i )t =
∑tf
s=t ν
⋆
i (s) < 0 for
some t. Let I = argmint(HT ν⋆i )t. We first note that x⋆ 6= 0 and further more there exists t0 ∈ I such that
x⋆i (t0) > 0. Otherwise, one can switch the value of x⋆i (t0) with that of some positive entry in x⋆i and obtain
an improved value of Wi(xi; ν⋆i ), which is a contradiction to the fact that x⋆i is the maximizer of Wi(xi; ν⋆i ).
Therefore,
1) if there exists t < t0 such that (HT ν⋆i )t > (HT ν⋆i )t0 , let t1 = max{t : (HT ν⋆i )t > (HT ν⋆i )t0 , t < t0} and
we then have ν⋆i (t1) > 0; otherwise (HT ν⋆i )t1 < (HT ν⋆i )t0 . Moreover, ν⋆i (t) = 0 for t1 < t < t0 if any.
We then set
ν⋆i (t0)← ν
⋆
i (t0) + ǫ
and
ν⋆i (t1)← ν
⋆
i (t1)− ǫ
where 0 < ǫ < min{ν⋆i (t1),−(HT ν⋆i )t0}, where “y ← x” signifies assigning the value of x to y. By doing
so, the value of Wi is strictly decreased while that of Ri is non-decreasing and the feasibility constraints
are maintained. We thus obtain an improved dual objective value, which leads to a contradiction.
2) If (HT ν⋆i )t = (HT ν⋆i )t0 for all t < t0 if any, we set
ν⋆i (t0)← ν
⋆
i (t0) + ǫ
where 0 < ǫ < −(HT ν⋆i )t0 , and the same argument applies as in 1).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Note first that
∑n
i=1 χ
⋆
i =
∑n
i=1 χi = min{1
TC, 1TD}. The proof of this claim is straightforward and we
thus omit it here for brevity. Without loss of generality, we assume that D is sorted in an ascending order,
and therefore χi is non-decreasing in i as the procedure suggests. Moreover, if χj < χi for some j < i, then
χj = Dj . Assume for contradiction that χ⋆i < χi ≤ Di for some i, and there then exists at least one j 6= i such
that χ⋆j > χj . Thus,
1) if j < i, then χj ≤ χi. If χj < χi, we have χ⋆j > χj = Dj , which is infeasible. Therefore, χj = χi
and consequently χ⋆j > χ⋆i . Hence, there exists some t such that x⋆j(t) > x⋆i (t). Consider an ǫ such that
0 < ǫ ≤ min{Di − χ
⋆
i , (x
⋆
j (t) − x
⋆
i (t))/2} and set x⋆j(t) ← x⋆j (t) − ǫ and x⋆i (t) ← x⋆i (t) + ǫ. We then
obtain a feasible but improved objective value, which is a contradiction.
2) If j > i, then χj ≥ χi. Hence χ⋆j > χ⋆i and the same argument applies.
The above argument also applies symmetrically to the case when χi < χ⋆i ≤ Di for some i. Therefore, χ⋆i = χi
for all i.
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APPENDIX D
DYNAMICS OF THE SINGLE-USER OPTIMAL CONTROL
We rule out the suboptimal cases as follows.
1. If x⋆(0) < z⋆(0), then y⋆(1) > 0 and ρ⋆(1) = ρ⋆(0)+M ′(y⋆(1)) +µ⋆(1) > ρ⋆(0). Hence, z⋆(1) ≥ z⋆(0) and
x⋆(1) ≤ x⋆(0), and the battery keeps charging until either fully charged before the time horizon and maintain
the state, or the time horizon is reached; however, this is clearly suboptimal.
2. If x⋆(0) > z⋆(0), which is only feasible when y0 > 0, let us consider the sequence of events x⋆(t) ≤ z⋆(t)
and y⋆(t) = 0. Let tx≤z be the first time step when x⋆(t) ≤ z⋆(t) or be infinity if it does not happen before the
horizon, and similarly we define other quantities.
2a) If x⋆(t) ≤ z⋆(t) happens before y⋆(t) = 0, i.e, t˜ := tx≤z < ty=0, then y⋆(t˜ + 1) ≥ y⋆(t˜) > 0 and thus
ρ⋆(t˜+ 1) = ρ⋆(t˜) +M ′(y⋆(t˜+ 1)) + µ⋆(t˜+ 1) > ρ⋆(t˜). Hence, z⋆(t˜+ 1) ≥ z⋆(t˜) and x⋆(t˜+ 1) ≤ x⋆(t˜),
and again we are in case 1, which is suboptimal. For the boundary case that tx<z = tf , the suboptimality
is also immediate, and we omit the discussion of boundary cases in the following.
2b) If tx≤z > ty=0 =: t˜, i.e., y⋆(t˜) = 0 while x⋆(t˜) > z⋆(t˜), this however is infeasible.
2c) If tx<z = ty=0 =: t˜, then y⋆(t˜+ 1) > 0 and ρ⋆(t˜+ 1) > ρ⋆(t˜). Hence, x⋆(t˜+ 1) < z⋆(t˜+ 1), and we are
in case (2a), which is suboptimal.
3. If x⋆(0) = z⋆(0) and y0 > 0, then this is clearly suboptimal.
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